Who is benefiting from fertilizer subsidies in Indonesia ? by Osorio, Camilo Gomez et al.
Policy Research Working Paper 5758







East Asia and Pacific Region


















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
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Using the Agricultural Census 2003 and the Rice 
Household Survey 2008 for Indonesia, this paper 
analyzes the distribution of benefits from fertilizer 
subsidies and their impact on rice production. The 
findings suggest that most farmers benefit from fertilizer 
subsidies; however, the 40 percent largest farmers capture 
up to 60 percent of the subsidy. The regressive nature of 
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the fertilizer subsidies is in line with research carried out 
in other countries, the result of larger farms using a larger 
volume of fertilizer. This paper confirms that fertilizer 
used in adequate quantities has a positive and significant 
impact on rice yields, but it also provides evidence that 
over-using fertilizer has an adverse impact on yields (an 
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1. Introduction 
Fertilizer subsidies have increased significantly since the beginning of the decade. In 2008, Indonesia 
directed over 50 percent of agriculture resources through direct subsidies for seeds, credit, fertilizer and 
rice (Figure 1.1). The budget for fertilizer subsidies, at over IDR 15 trillion, was almost double the budget 
for the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) at the central government level, slightly above IDR 8 trillion.  
Figure 1.1   Share of national agriculture spending 
 
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
Fertilizer subsidies have grown to become one of the largest spending items of the sector.  As Figure 1.2 
shows, by end-2008 the allocation for agriculture subsidies was four times its 2001 level, while resources 
for irrigation have remained flat over the same period. The budget of the MoA, while significantly higher 
than in 2001, has grown at a far slower pace than agriculture subsidies. 
Figure 1.2  Index of agriculture spending, 2001-08 
 
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 3 
 
As in many countries, the provision of input subsidies is a highly political and very sensitive issue, 
particularly as it is linked to the long stated goal of the Government of Indonesia (GoI) of achieving self-
sufficiency in rice production. The government continues to allocate a significant share of resources to 
subsidization in agriculture. The 2008 budget channeled close to 0.4 percent of GDP and Rp 29.4 trillion 
to subsidies for rice, fertilizers, seeds, and agricultural credit, of which the first two absorbed the bulk of 
the resources.  
In this paper we seek to analyze the fertilizer subsidies from two different angles, both important for 
policy makers in the country. Firstly, we analyze who is benefiting from the current system of fertilizer 
subsidies, and secondly we estimate the impact that a removal of the fertilizer subsidies would have on 
rice production. Agriculture continues to play a very important role on the country’s economy, but more 
importantly the production and price of rice is a key variable for Indonesian policy makers. As such, any 
analysis in this area has to look beyond efficiency and include equity considerations as well as the long-
term goal of self-sufficiency in rice.  
In the second section of this paper, we provide a short snapshot of the fertilizer system in Indonesia, as 
well as provide some data on fertilizer production and distribution. We focus on urea, since this fertilizer 
represents the bulk of the fertilizer used by rice farmers and it captures most of the subsidies being 
provided to the industry. In the third section, we conduct a benefit incidence analysis to show that the 
fertilizer subsidy is relatively regressive, with the 40 percent largest farmers capturing 60 percent of the 
total subsidy. In the forth section we estimate the impact of fertilizer use on rice yields, showing that the 
relationship is positive up to a point, beyond which the impact of additional use of fertilizer on yields is 
negative.  We  also  show  the  relative  inefficiency  of  the  subsidy  in  increasing  rice  production,  since 
fertilizer subsidies are significantly higher than the value of the increase in production achieved through 
the fertilizer subsidy. In the fifth section we discuss the rationale for subsidizing agricultural inputs and 
review some of the international experience to date. Finally, section six concludes and provides some 
policy recommendations. 
For this research we use two different surveys by the National Statistics Office (BPS), the Agricultural 
Census 2003 and the Rice Household Survey 2008. The first comprises a random sample of over 46,000 
rice farmers in 29 provinces, while the latter uses a smaller sample of over 11,000 rice farmers from the 
15 largest rice-producing provinces in Indonesia. The results of the benefit incidence analysis is very 
similar using both surveys; there is little targeting in the subsidy, with the largest farmers capturing a 
disproportionate share of the subsidy. 
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2. Fertilizer Subsidies in Context 
As stated by the MoA, the fertilizer subsidy program in Indonesia seeks to achieve two objectives.
1  First, 
it seeks to increase agriculture productivity and preserve national food security and, second, it aims to 
enhance  farmers’  ability  to  optimize  the  use  of  fertilizer.  However,  there  is  also  a  sense  that  the 
program is a tool to achieve broader goals, ascribing to the program the objectives of maintaining 
farmers’ welfare, poverty alleviation or a price stabilizer. 
Public spending on fertilizer subsidies has increased far more than production costs for the industry. In 
the manufacture of urea, natural gas is the main input and the increasing gas costs worldwide drove 
international  urea  prices  upward  by  50  percent  between  2007  and  2008.  However,  the  subsidy  in 
Indonesia grew even faster, at 142 percent over the same period, suggesting that production costs are 
not  the  sole  driver  of  increased  spending  (Figure  2.1).  Today,  as  this  budget  item  represents  an 
important component of agriculture assistance, it is crucial to understand who captures the benefits of 
these fertilizer subsidies and whether they result in increased rice production.    
Figure 2.1 Fertilizer subsidies and international urea prices, 2004-08 
 
Source: World Bank staff calculations. 
Fertilizer production in Indonesia is dominated by a state-owned holding company. For more than three 
decades, Indonesia has pursued policies seeking to encourage greater fertilizer use by farmers as a way 
to enhance agricultural productivity.  This has resulted in a fertilizer industry that heavily focuses on the 
production of urea and to a lesser extent other single compound fertilizers such as SP-36. Fertilizer 
production is a monopoly controlled by five state-owned companies that mostly produce urea under 
one holding company, PT Agro Kimia Indonesia. The two largest producers, PT PKT and PT Pusri, account 
for three-quarters of the total urea production. The main input for the production of domestic urea is 
natural gas, while the main raw material for non-urea fertilizers is potassium, which Indonesia imports 
for its domestic suppliers. The private sector only emerged as a player in the 1990s and holds a very 
small share of the market. It is involved only in the production of mixed-compound fertilizers and, due 
to  price  controls  and  subsidies,  no  private  sector  firms  have  entered  the  market  to  supply  single-
                                                 
1 Source: MoA Decree  No. 42/Permentan/OT.140/2008  and Presidential Speech to the House of Representative, August 15, 2008 5 
 
compound fertilizers. The subsidies for single-compound fertilizers have led to a wide price gap between 
single- and mixed-compound inputs, depressing the demand for mixed-compound inputs where the 
private sector could play a bigger role.   
The distribution system of subsidized fertilizer is very complex, heavily regulated and involves several 
government layers. Ensuring the availability of fertilizer to the whole of Indonesia, including remote 
rural areas, is another key concern of the government. Distribution of fertilizer is regulated by a decree, 
which includes import quotas for certain companies, export restrictions, and it lays down the type of 
documentation that distributors and retailers have to present, all of which add to the heavy regulatory 
environment surrounding the production and marketing of fertilizer. Producers are only allowed to 
export fertilizer after domestic demand has been fully met, but despite frequently reported fertilizer 
shortages, legal exports of urea fertilizer were stopped only in 2006.  
Distribution of fertilizer in Indonesia follows a ‘regionalization policy’, in which suppliers were assigned 
to geographical areas (mostly large islands). Each of the four urea producers is responsible for several 
provinces and tasked with identifying and monitoring distributors in each of the provinces, which are 
made  responsible  for  organizing  distribution  down  to  the  village  level.  As  a  way  of  avoiding  urea 
shortages, the law requires producers to supply their mandated areas first. This regionalization of the 
distribution results in a lack of competition for market share and costumers that has removed incentives 
to innovate and to invest in producing and distributing fertilizer more efficiently. This in itself may be 
contributing to the reported fertilizer shortages. Limited competition for customers and markets and 
relative price distortions have led to low levels of investments by Indonesia’s fertilizer manufacturers, 
which has resulted in aging plants, difficulty in obtaining inputs such as natural gas and the impossibility 
to face higher production costs from rising fuel prices.  
The GoI provides subsidies to the fertilizer industry to compensate for ceiling prices below market 
prices.  The  subsidy  system  to  the  fertilizer  industry  has  undergone  significant  changes  since  its 
inception, from government purchasing of all fertilizer on a ‘cost plus fee’ basis to taking the border 
price as a reference for subsidizing production. The fertilizer subsidy system provides input subsidies for 
fertilizer producers (e.g. natural gas) to allow for a maximum retail price, which is determined annually 
by the MoA. In addition, to ensure availability of fertilizer, the MoA, in consultation with the provincial 
governments, determines production targets for each fertilizer firm based on estimated demand for 
fertilizer, both subsidized and non-subsidized. In 2006, as the fiscal cost of subsidies increased together 
with fuel prices, the government revised its subsidy system for fertilizer, providing subsidies to cover the 
difference between the maximum retail price set by the GoI and a breakeven point for fertilizer firms 
that is estimated annually by the State Ministry for State-Owned Enterprises.  
Several attempts have been made to improve the targeting of fertilizer subsidies in order to avoid 
leakage  to  larger  farms  or  estate  crops  and  reduce  the  fiscal  burden  of  fertilizer  subsidies.  These 
attempts include limiting beneficiaries of subsidized fertilizer to small farmers (with less than 2 hectares 
per planting season) or small aquaculture farmers (with less than 1 hectare) and piloting the use of 
‘smart  cards’  for  the  targeting  of  subsidies  to  small  farmers.  In  2009,  the  MoA  plans  to  provide 
subsidized fertilizer only to those farmers who have registered in advance with the district agency for 
agriculture, which will need to be accompanied by certification by village authorities.  
The government objective of ensuring wide access to fertilizer at affordable prices is only partially 
fulfilled. There are widespread complaints of fertilizer shortages, particularly as the planting season 
nears. Some of the reasons for these problems could be the regulated nature of the market, with the 6 
 
MoA being responsible for estimating the need for fertilizer (both subsidized and unsubsidized), the 
location where it will be used, and the type of fertilizer that farmers will use, as well as the price at 
which it has to be sold. Changes in production trends are not easily incorporated into yearly production 
plans and price estimates. The type of information that would be necessary to project the correct 
amount (and price) of fertilizer is unlikely to be available to the MoA, leading to shortages in production 
and  imports.  Further  regulations  originating  from  the  other  ministries  involved  (Ministry  of  Trade, 
Ministry of Industry and State Ministry for State-Owned Enterprises) increase the uncertainty for the 
private sector, resulting in very little private sector involvement in the production of fertilizer. 
The  subsidy  system  itself  is  contributing  to  some  of  the  fertilizer  shortages.  The  price  difference 
between subsidized fertilizer and the market price creates incentives for subsidized fertilizer to be sold 
outside the system, to other retailers/ dealers, exported to foreign buyers or to end users for whom it 
was not intended (e.g. large plantations). Although there are no estimates of how much subsidized 
fertilizer ends up exported or used for estate crops, it could be substantial and this would explain the 
persistence of fertilizer shortages despite large increases in the budget for fertilizer subsidies. Limits to 
the profitability of increasing production, such as the need to sell in Indonesia at depressed prices, also 
limits the incentives for producers to increase production. The central determination of quantities to be 
produced, the prices of the fertilizer and locations where the fertilizer can be sold, provides little room 
for fertilizer companies to expand production and compete with one another. 
The demand for fertilizer in Indonesia has grown steadily over the past decade at around 5 percent per 
year.  Indonesia has doubled its consumption of urea at 5 million tons in 2007 when compared with its 
level in the year 2000.  Conversely,  demand for other fertilizers  such as SP36 increased  by only 30 
percent over the same period. Demand for urea is bolstered by the subsidies (to the detriment of other 
types of fertilizer), as suggested by the substitution of urea with AS (ammonia-based) and SP36 (super-
phosphate-based) between 1999 and 2001, when Indonesia briefly stopped the fertilizer subsidies.  
 
Table 2.1 Fertilizer agriculture consumption in Indonesia, 1994-2007 
 
  UREA  AS  TSP/SP.36  KCL  TOTAL 
1994  3,288,466  614,553  1,124,533  302,080  5,329,632 
1995  3,710,455  652,999  1,069,909  403,900  5,837,263 
1996  3,917,858  588,192  900,284  375,293  5,781,627 
1997  3,323,601  350,503  663,478  350,270  4,687,852 
1998  4,289,648  407,898  868,837  172,133  5,738,516 
1999  3,140,033  243,906  394,949  380,000  4,158,888 
2000  2,673,113  594,710  623,260  400,000  4,291,083 
2001  4,069,585  580,724  778,689  425,000  5,853,998 
2002  4,022,387  529,399  670,775  450,000  5,672,561 
2003  4,336,729  511,129  1,414,091  63,715  6,325,664 
2004  4,656,723  633,404  789,164  1,012,295  7,091,586 
2005  4,842,537  651,986  778,706  947,212  7,220,441 
2006  5,107,886  684,100  817,033  1,039,295  7,648,314 
2007  5,010,434  745,378  802,812  1,382,166  7,940,790 
Source: Indonesia Fertilizer Producer Association, 2007. 
 
After  briefly  reviewing  the  characteristics  of  the  fertilizer  industry  and  the  challenges  ahead,  the 
following section analyzes who is benefiting from the fertilizer subsidies.   7 
 
3. Who Benefits from Fertilizer Subsidies in Indonesia? 
The  incidence  of  benefits  from  fertilizer  subsidies  is  analyzed  using  two  different  rural  household 
surveys by BPS: the Agriculture Census 2003 and the BPS Rice Household Survey 2008. The first survey 
comprises a random sample of 46,144 farmers for the rice subsector in 29 provinces. It was collected in 
2004 and asked farmers about their usage of inputs in 2003. The latter survey entails data from a 
smaller sample of 11,297 rice farmers from 15 provinces regarding the harvest in 2007 (covering the 15 
largest rice producers in Indonesia and collected in 2008). 
Methodology  
The incidence analysis looks at two types of fertilizers, urea and SP36, and estimates the spending share 
captured by farmers according to their land size. The subsidy is defined as the difference between the 
market price for fertilizer and the actual prices paid by farmers as reported in these two BPS surveys. In 
addition, the GoI established a ceiling price for fertilizer (HET) that is below the market price and market 
prices are reported by the State Audit Agency (BPK), the ‘cost of goods sold’ or CoGS.
2  Thus, one can 
estimate if farmers received subsidy benefits by looking at their paying prices.  Those farmers reporting 
paying at the HET captured fully subsidized fertilizer, while those farmers paying below the market and 
above the HET, received partial subsidy assistance. The analysis looks at the volume of fertilizer used  
and at what price and divides the farmers in 5 equal quintiles by the size of their total agricultural land 
(where quintile 1 groups the smaller-plot farmers and quintile 5 the largest).
3 By aggregating the amount 
of subsidy spending captured by each farm er in a quintile, one can see how much subsidy assistance 
benefited each group. (See Annex I for a more detailed discussion on the methodology.) 
Small farmers on average use more fertilizer per hectare. In 2007, the smaller rice producers used twice 
as much urea per hectare and harvested higher yields than farmers with the larger rice paddies  (Table 
3.1). This often leads to over-use of fertilizer (Figure 3.1). This may also reflect price distortions in input 
markets, which have led small farmers to substitute alternative inputs (other fertilizer, better seeds) for 
urea, as suggested by the increase in the demand for non -urea fertilizer following the removal of 
subsidies in 1999-2001. In contrast, larger farmers have greater access and better quality inputs, as well 
as better quality information and can, therefore, use an optimal mix of agriculture inputs.  
   
                                                 
2 The CoGS is taken as reported in the BPK reports, with the exception of the CoGS for urea in 2003 that is an estimate (see Annex 
I).   In 2003, the HET price for urea was Rp 1,150 per kg and the CoGS was Rp 1,489, while for 2007 the HET was Rp 1,200 per kg 
and the weighted average of the CoGS of four producers stood at  Rp 2,170.5.  Consequently, the HET price for SP-36 in 2003 was 
Rp 1,400 and the CoGS was Rp 1,629, while by 2007 the HET reached Rp 1,500 and the CoGS was Rp 2,395. 
3 The land size variable includes total agriculture land  for  farmers that either, rented, owned, or sharecropped rice paddies. A 
different analysis, grouping farmers by the size of their gross revenues from rice (where quintile 1 holds the poorest individuals and 
quintile 5 the richest), corroborates the findings reported in this section. The results of this analysis are reported in Annex III.   8 
 




Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 











(kg/ha)  (kg/ha)  (kg/ha)  (ha) 
1  4,836  343  7.1%  164  0.12 
2  4,596  291  6.4%  151  0.25 
3  4,447  268  6.1%  136  0.41 
4  4,053  224  5.6%  118  0.73 
5  3,490  170  5.0%  88  1.97 
Average/Total  4,283  259  6.0%   132  0.7 
 
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
The data on fertilizer consumption in Indonesia show that farmers use more urea than recommended by 
the MoA. While the optimal levels of urea required per hectare vary according to soil quality across 
islands in Indonesia, the MoA recommends using 200-250 kg/ha of urea and 50-100 kg/ha for SP36 
fertilizer.
4 However, as Table 2.1 illustrates, all farmers in quintiles 1-3 used more than the suggested 
amount of fertilizer. In the case of SP36, only the larger farmers in quintile 5 consumed within the 
recommended range. 
Benefit Incidence Analysis 
There is no evidence of targeting subsidized urea. When looking at the incidence of benefits by land-size 
in 2003, there were subtle differences that favored the smaller farmers (those in land-size quintiles 1-3).  
Yet, while the coverage of the subsidy program increased in 2007 the targeting was ineffective and 
these differences disappeared.  (See Figures 3.2 and 3.3, which show that all quintiles benefitted equally 
                                                 
4 These recommended level does not include blends with organic fertilizer.   MoA Decree No. 01/Kpts/SR.130/I/2006  (Lampiran 




























0 1 2 3
Land size (ha)9 
 
from  the  fertilizer  subsidy.)  As  the  government  increased  spending  on  fertilizer  subsidies,  a  larger 
number of farmers benefited. In 2003,  close to 65 percent of surveyed farmers reported capturing 
either full or partial assistance, and this number increased to 96 percent in 2007. 
Figure 3.2  Farmers receiving subsidized urea by 
quintiles of land size, 2003 
Figure 3.3  Farmers receiving subsidized urea by 
quintiles of land size, 2007 
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations.               . 
Very few farmers are paying for fertilizers at the HET regulated price.  The fact that most beneficiaries 
belong to the partial subsidy group and the evident reduction of the full subsidy group over time suggest 
that fertilizer shortages drove prices upwards.  In 2007, about 10 percent of the farmers paid the HET or 
below, while a large majority of the farmers in all quintiles paid above the HET regulated prices for 
fertilizer.    
There is evidence that, on average, farmers paid 
similar  prices  for  fertilizer.
5  In  2007,  farmers  in 
the  first  quintile  paid  on  average  Rp 1,549  and 
Rp 2,221 per kg of urea and SP36, respectively, 
while those in quintile 5 paid on average Rp 1,530 
and Rp 2,265 for these inputs. In general, farmers 
were  charged  28  percent  above  the  regulated 
urea  price  (HET),  while  a  bag  of  SP36  was  on 
average 45 percent more expensive than that of 
urea (Table 3.2).   
Public spending to subsidize urea is regressive and a large share of the benefits is captured by the larger 
farmers
6. The larger farmers use greater quantities of fertilizer, which means they absorb more public 
resources. In both 2003 and 2007 surveys, the 40  percent largest farmers capture up to 60 percent of 
                                                 
5 The mean difference ANOVA tests between quintiles (Bonferroni, Scheffe, Sidak 1969) show small, but statistically significant 
mean differences in urea prices  amongst the land quintiles 1, 2, & 3.  In the case of SP36, the mean differences were only 
statistically significant between quintiles 2, and 5 and 3 and 5.  (See  for a discussion on these tests, Abdi, H (2007)) 
6 Throughout this policy note, large farmers does not necessarily mean large in absolute terms, since the average size even in the 
largest quintile is below 2 ha of land, but these farmers are large relative to the farmers in the other quintiles. These differences in 
land-size groups in the sample translate into significant differences in income across quintiles, where farmers in quintile 5 earn on 
average 7 times more gross revenues from rice than farmers in the lowest quintile.  In interpreting the results of our analysis, it is 
important to keep in mind both the small size of most farms in the sample, as well as the large differences in average farm size and 
income between quintiles.  








1  1,549  2,221  0.12 
2  1,512  2,173  0.25 
3  1,507  2,182  0.41 
4  1,522  2,167  0.73 
5  1,530  2,265  1.97 
       
Average  1,524  2,202  0.7 
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 10 
 
the  total  subsidy.    (Figure  3.4  illustrates  the  positive  relationship  between  urea  subsidy  spending 
captured and the size of farmers’ agriculture land, while Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show how these public 
resources were distributed across these five farmer groups.)  
Figure 3.4  Captured urea subsidy spending and land size, 2007 
 
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
These findings are corroborated by the fact that both surveys show a similar distribution of benefits.  
However,  these  data  were  gathered  at  two  different  periods  of  the  subsidy  program  and  for  two 
different random samples of rice farmers. Thus, the results raise equity concerns because the income 
differences between these farmer groups are striking: the larger farmers in quintile 5 generated on 
average gross revenues from rice seven times greater than the smaller rice growers in quintile 1.   
Figure 3.5  Distribution of urea subsidy 
spending by quintiles of land size, 2003 
Figure 3.6  Distribution of urea subsidy 
spending by quintiles of land size, 2007 
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations.          
The  total  subsidy  spending  that  benefited  quintiles  4  and  5  was  greater  than  the  combined  share 
captured by farmers in the three smaller quintiles, as seen in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. These findings are 
independent of the assumed market price for fertilizers. A sensitivity analysis, presented in Annex VII, 
shows that these results are independent of the market price (CoGs) reported by the BPK, over which 
the subsidy was estimated.  Thus, increasing and decreasing the market price for urea by 10 percent 
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Figure 3.7  Urea subsidy spending by land size, 
2003 
Figure 3.8 Urea subsidy spending by land size, 
2007 
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations.          
As in the case of urea, there was no targeting of subsidized SP36 and the benefits were regressive, 
benefiting  the  larger  farmers.  SP36  is  a  more  expensive  input  than  urea  that  is  produced  by  one 
company in Indonesia, PT Petro Kimia Gresik (PKG). It comprises a smaller share of the total subsidy 
expenditures,  but  the  data  show  a  similar  incidence  story  (Annex  II).  While  in  2003,  the  subsidies 
seemed to be benefiting a larger share of small farmers, by 2007 these differences across quintiles 
disappeared (Annex II, Figures II.1 and II.2). As in the case of urea, the share of farmers that received the 
subsidy increased significantly from 43 percent (2003) to 68 percent (2007), but it remains lower than 
the share of farmers benefiting from subsidized urea in 2007 (96 percent). As in the case of urea, a large 
share of the subsidies is captured by larger farmers in quintiles 4 and 5, with 62 percent of all subsidies 
going to these two quintiles in 2007. 
There are significant fiscal savings to be made by improving targeting of the fertilizer subsidy. Assuming 
a similar distribution of subsidy spending for Indonesia such as that in Figures 3.7 and 3.8 and providing 
the same amount of subsidies to the smallest 60 percent of the farmers, the government would have 
saved over Rp 9 trillion from the fertilizer subsidy budget in 2008. Having explored the distribution of 
benefits of the fertilizer subsidy, one question remains unanswered.  Has fertilizer usage translated into 
greater agriculture production in Indonesia? 
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4. What Is the Impact of Urea Consumption on Rice Production? 
This section estimates the impact of fertilizer subsidies on urea consumption and the impact of urea use 
on  rice  yields.    A  simple  micro-model  using  data  from  the  2007  household  survey  explores  two 
important questions: What is the effect of the fertilizer subsidy on urea consumption, and what impact 
does urea usage have on rice production? The model proposed allows for diminishing returns to the use 
of fertilizer (by including a quadratic term for urea used), implying that there is an optimal point for urea 
usage beyond which yields start to decline. The quantity of urea consumed depends on: the price of 
urea, the price of other fertilizers (which are proxied with the price of SP36), the price of rice, and the 
price of rice seeds.  In turn, the impact of urea on rice yields is dependent on: the quantity of urea used, 
the consumption of other inputs (land, labor, irrigation), and controls for soil quality (a dummy variable 
for Java-Bali) and human capital (in this case, the years of education and the age of the head of the 
household). The model to be estimated is summarized below: 
ln rice_yield =  + 1 ln urea_used + 2 ln urea_usedsq + 3 ln land_sizei + 4 ln labor_cost  
+5 irrigation  + 6educ  + 7age  + 8Java&Bali  +                             (1) 
where urea_used is the fitted value of the regression:          (2) 
ln urea_used=  + 1 lnprice_urea + 2 ln price_SP + 3 ln price_seeds +4 lnprice_rice    
+ 5 ln land_sizei + 6 ln labor_cost  +7irrigation  + 8educ  + 9age  + 10Java&Bali  +   
And urea_usedsq  is the fitted value of the regression:          (3)   
ln urea_usedsq=  + 1 lnprice_urea + 2 ln price_SP + 3 ln price_seeds +4 lnprice_rice    





rice_yield is the quantity of rice (kg/ha) 
urea_used is the quantity of urea used (kg/ha) 
urea_usedsq is the square term of  urea used 
land_size is the size of the cultivated rice field (ha) 
labor_cost is the total cost of labor ($/ha)
8 
irrigation is a dummy variable (1 for irrigated land) 
price_urea is the price of urea  
price_SP is the price of SP36 fertilizer 
price_seeds is the price of the most commonly used rice seeds -superior ($/kg) 
price_rice  is the dried grain price of rice at which the farmer sold the last harvest.
9  
educ is the years of education of the head of the household 
age is the age of the household 
Java&Bali is a dummy variable (1 for provinces in Java and Bali) 
e, v, and z are error terms  
                                                 
7 A word of caution is necessary when interpreting the results. This model focuses on understanding the relationship between 
fertilizer use and rice yields. A model to better understand the factors determining rice production is a far more complex undertaking 
which requires additional information unavailable at this stage, such as the quality of rice seeds, irrigation and soil. 
8 Labor costs: The number of workers multiplied by their reported salary.  For those non-wage workers, the average salary for men 
and women is assumed for the estimation. An alternate specification used labor inputs measured in man days per hectare and 
showed similar results.  
9 The rice price influences the quantity of urea used by providing farmers with the means and incentives to buy fertilizer. Although 
the dried grain price at which farmer’s sell their output rice (the information provided in the survey) may differ from the price  farmers 
faced when buying  inputs (not provided by the survey),  both prices will be strongly correlated.  Therefore, this model uses this 
post-harvest  information from the survey  as a  proxy for  the rice  price.   13 
 
There are some challenges in estimating this model, primarily the inability to take into account how 
farmers’  incomes  may  drive  both  rice  yields  and  urea  use.  Estimating  the  relationship  presents  a 
potential endogeneity problem. This is because urea used will most likely be correlated with the error 
term in the yields equation because of omitted variable bias.
10  Those omitted variables that have an 
impact on yields, but were not included in the regression, either observable or unobservable effects, will 
be captured in the error term.  Farmers’ incomes will most likely impact yields, but in the absence of a 
measure of wealth in the survey, it cannot be captured in the yields equation (1) explained below. Thus, 
income is a driver of yields if richer farmers have different production levels than poorer farmers as a 
result of being less credit constrained, risk averse, or having access to better farming techniques.  On the 
other hand, income will determine how much urea farmers can buy and, for poorer farmers, spending 
on inputs accounts for a much higher share of their resources. Therefore, omitted variable bias can drive 
the relationship between urea usage and the error term when income is not accounted for in the yields 
equation. Other omitted variables that can impact yields include: the quality of irrigation, private capital, 
and effort or ability to grow rice. 
To address this endogeneity problem, the model is estimated using an instrumental variable (IV) through 
a two-stage least square regression (2SLS).
11 The 2SLS estimator calculates the fitted values of the urea 
regression (2) and the fitted values of urea used squared (3) to use as IV’s and indirectly capture the 
impact on the yields regression (1).  In the first stage regression, it breaks urea used (and urea used 
squared)  into  2  components,  a  “problematic  one”  correlated  with  the  error  term  and  a  “non-
problematic” exogenous component.  Then, it takes the exogenous parts of urea used (and urea used 
squared) to capture the effect on the rice yields.  There are two conditions to meet in order for this 
estimator to be valid: (i) instrument relevance, where the correlation between urea fitted and urea used 
is different from 0; and (ii) instrument exogeneity, where the correlation between urea fitted and the 
error term (e) is 0. Both these conditions are met by the model in this section.
12  
The model looks at the relationship across the overall sample and also within each quintile of land size, 
given that urea usage and yields vary significantl y according to plot size.   The overall model captures 
better the relationship as a whole, is estimated over a wider sample, and allows for geographical 
differences with a dummy for Java-Bali. However, estimating the relationship at the quintile level shows 
interesting differences that illustrate smaller farmers having higher yields and on average using more 
urea than recommended.  Interestingly, by grouping individuals according to the size of their rice 
paddies also captures farming variations across provi nces because farms tend to be much smaller in 
Java-Bali (and are planted more intensively). Table 4.1 below suggests that larger farmers (quintile 5) 
can be predominantly found off-Java, while the composition of quintiles 1-4 is two thirds either Javanese 
or Balinese.  Therefore, breaking the sample into land groups allows for the production functions to vary 
by land size and by geographical location.   
   
                                                 
10 The results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity confirm that urea used is correlated with the error term in the yields 
equation (1), (Stock and Watson 2003). 
11 See Annex VII for a comparison between 2SLS and OLS estimators. 
12 Instrument exogeneity in the model was tested with the overidentifying restrictions test and failed to reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity. The instruments used and results presented in this section meet the condition of  exogeneity and are statistically valid. 
(Stock and Watson, 2003). 14 
 
Table 4.1  Distribution of farmers,  model sample  2007 
Farmers  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Overall 
Java-Bali (%)  89  79  76  68  36  70 
Off Java-Bali (%)  11  21  24  32  64  30 
Total (No of farmers)  1,575  1,576  1,577  1,577  1,578  7,883 
Source: World Bank staff calculations. 
 
The results below suggest there is a positive impact on rice yields when using urea at adequate levels, 
but there is a threshold that, if exceeded, the relationship reverses and fertilizer starts having a negative 
impact (Table 4.2 (1)).  
Table 4.2  Estimation results (2SLS second stage regression) in 2007 
Dependent variable: 
Rice yields 








   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Urea use  4.2098  0.4997  0.4269  0.3091  0.3506  0.1552 
  (2.26)*  (7.54)**  (6.43)**  (4.28)**  (4.77)**  (2.31)* 
Urea use squared  -0.3882           
  (-2.08)*           
Land size  -0.0959  -0.0685  -0.0472  -0.1029  -0.1383  -0.2004 
  (-5.86)**  (-3.27)**  (-2.25)*  (-4.56)**  (-4.90)**  (-7.59)** 
Labor cost  0.0431  0.0561  0.0540  0.0740  0.0958  0.0760 
  (3.08)**  (5.50)**  (4.84)**  (5.84)**  (6.84)**  (7.24)** 
Dummy irrigation  0.0339  0.0216  0.0089  0.0383  0.0403  0.1017 
  (2.76)**  (1.18)  (0.53)  (2.03)*  (1.74)+  (3.25)** 
Education  -0.0006  0.0034  0.0042  0.0026  -0.0012  0.0003 
  (-0.32)  (1.32)  (1.64)  (1.01)  (-0.42)  (0.09) 
Age  -0.001  -0.0007  0.0013  -0.0019  -0.0006  -0.0014 
  (-1.82)+  (-1.04)  (0.34)  (-2.43)*  (-0.68)  (-1.22) 
Dummy for Java-Bali   -0.0937  -0.1625  -0.1384  -0.096  -0.1148  -0.0021 
  (-4.49)**  (-4.39)**  (-4.69)**  (-2.86)**  (-3.28)**  (-0.06) 
Constant  -2.3646  5.8908  6.0816  7.1419  6.9928  8.5999 
  (-0.52)  (17.11)**  (15.57)**  (15.84)**  (13.80)**  (17.43)** 
R-squared  .  .  0.09  0.25  0.32  0.30 
z statistics in parentheses.                
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
All variables are estimated in natural logarithm 
         
The impact of fertilizer use on yields is not uniform, and smaller in magnitude and significance 
for larger farms off-Java. When looking at the relationship between fertilizer use and yields by 
quintile, a linear model seems to fit the relationship better (the urea squared term is not 
significant), which differs from the non-linear relationship found for the overall sample.  The 
fact that the relationship is different when breaking down the sample by land size suggests 
that smaller farmers have a different production function than larger farmers.  Also,  the 
analysis  by  plot  size  captures  geographical  differences  in  rice  farming  that  could  lead  to 
different production functions; for example, in Java, farms are not only smaller or sowed more 15 
 
intensively, but soil quality is better and farmers have higher years of schooling.   
At the quintile level, estimating the model linearly shows that a 1 percent increase in urea use 
increases yields by 0.31-0.49 percent on Java and 0.16 percent mostly off-Java.  Within Java-
Bali, quintiles 1-4 show differences  in the impact of urea use on yields and a much  larger 
effect on the yields of smaller farms. Similarly, the urea consumption of the bigger farms in 
quintile  5,  mostly  off-Java  farms,  reflect  the  lowest  boost  in  yields  for  the  sample.    This 
suggests that other deteminants (land size, irrigation, labor) are more significant drivers of 
yields than fertilizer for the larger producers, and it is not surprising that, since they are less 
credit constrained and have access to better information, other determinants are better able 
to explain their variation in rice yields.    
Most control variables behave as expected: land size is negatively associated with yields, while 
agricultural  inputs  (labor  and  irrigation)  are  positively  associated.  Land  size  is  negatively 
associated with rice yields, as anticipated given that smaller plots are farmed more intensively. 
The dummy for Java-Bali, which is introduced to proxy for different soil qualities, shows that 
on-Java more urea is consumed compared with off-Java (a positive and significant effect). 
Nonetheless, one would expect to find a positive relationship between the dummy for Java-
Bali and yields, to reflect the better soil quality in these islands. As such, the significant and 
negative relationship in most quintiles is surprising (with the exception of quintile 5 where it is 
inconclusive),
13 and signals that the dummy may not be such a good proxy or the fact that 
other variables in the model (irrigation, fertilizer) are already explaining much of the impact 
from soil quality. Increased labor (including non-wage labor or unpaid family members) is also 
positively  associated  with  higher  rice  yields,  and  this  is  particularly  true  in  larger  farms 
(quintiles 4 and 5), where the effect is greater in magnitude and significance. As expected the 
findings show that the effect on rice yields from using diverse inputs varied between small and 
larger farmers.
14  
Further research is required to capture the relationship between irrigation and rice yields. 
While the impact from the dummy for irrigation is positive and significant (and greater in 
magnitude for the larger farmers), the survey data did not allow capturing factors such as: 
maintenance,  the  quality  of  the  irrigation  network,  or  the  extent  to  which  existing 
infrastructure  is  operational,  which  are  the  true  drivers  of  the  relationship  with  yields.  
Therefore, further research may shed light on the impact of these factors in determining rice 
production.
15  
Not surprisingly, the urea price is negatively associated with urea use, although there are 
significant  differences  by farm  size  (Table  4.3).   The  consumption of  urea  in  the  smallest 
farmers (quintile 1) is the least affected by the urea price.  However, urea consumption of the 
largest farmers mostly off-Java (quintile 5) is highly sensitive to changes in fertilizer subsidies, 
as well as quintile 2 farmers that are mostly composed of Javanese farmers.   
                                                 
13 The fact that the dummy for Java-Bali is not significant in the quintile 5 suggests that for these larger farms, which are mostly 
located off-Java, soil quality is not a driver of yields and that soil characteristics are more homogenous.   
14 One production input that could be controlled for is capital inputs. There is limited information from both surveys to control for 
investments that farmers may be doing in their fields.   
15 There may be measurement error in the irrigation variable. The surveys show that about 50 percent of all rice farmers grow rice 
in irrigated fields (sawah), both in Java and outside Java. This is much lower than widespread perceptions and data published by 
BPS, which show that over 90 percent of rice produced in Indonesia is grown in irrigated fields.
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Table 4.3  Estimation results (2SLS first  stage regression) in 2007 
Dependent variable: 
Urea use and Urea 





Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
   (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Urea price  -0.4123  -4.0166  -0.2568  -0.4949  -0.3980  -0.2981  -0.5096 
  (-11.30)**  (-11.19)**  (-3.76)**  (-6.29)**  (-5.12)**  (-3.58)**  (-5.40)** 
SP price  -0.1901  -1.9744  -0.2587  -0.1535  -0.1614  -0.2699  -0.1745 
  (-6.19)**  (-6.53)**  (-4.23)**  (-2.47)*  (-2.35)*  (-3.64)**  (-2.30)* 
Seeds price  0.1343  1.301  0.109  0.0329  0.0992  0.1638  0.1924 
  (7.40)**  (7.29)**  (-3.37)**  (0.86)  (2.43)*  (3.86)**  (4.07)** 
Rice price  -0.2353  -2.4983  -0.3366  -0.0842  -0.1614  -0.2989  -0.3564 
  (-4.74)**  (-5.12)**  (-3.83)**  (-0.83)  (-1.53)  (-2.49)*  (-2.59)** 
Land size  -0.2834  -2.7681  -0.0231  -0.1166  -0.1993  -0.3188  -0.3497 
  (-33.72)**  (-33.48)**  (-0.84)  (3.43)**  (-6.24)**  (-10.84)**  (-15.35)** 
Labor cost  0.0846  0.7801  0.0223  0.0586  0.0865  0.1294  0.0938 
  (12.91)**  (12.09)**  (1.52)  (3.54)**  (4.84)**  (7.83)**  (7.60)** 
Dummy irrigation  0.0947  0.9417  0.0632  -0.0026  0.0458  0.1016  0.2276 
  (6.99)**  (7.06)**  (2.49)*  (-0.10)  (1.55)  (3.13)**  (6.13)** 
Education  -0.0005  -0.0003  0.0029  -0.0048  0.0023  -0.0016  0.0039 
  (0.25)  (-0.02)  (0.77)  (-1.21)  (0.55)  (-0.38)  (0.86) 
Age  0.0005  0.0036  0.0014  -0.0007  0.001  0.0009  0.0000 
  (0.81)  (0.62)  (1.34)  (-0.63)  -0.75  -0.66  (-0.02) 
Dummy Java-Bali   0.2976  2.9552  0.258  0.2696  0.2842  0.2595  0.3043 
  (17.74)**  (17.90)**  (6.07)**  (7.53)**  (7.63)**  (7.02)**  (7.43)** 
Constant  11.9444  96.2634  10.8608  11.0279  10.6926  11.9695  13.4387 
  (26.10)**  (21.38)**  (12.40)**  (11.25)**  (10.79)**  (10.90)**  (10.99)** 
R-squared  0.27  0.27  0.13  0.12  0.13  0.18  0.26 
t statistics in parentheses            
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
All variables are estimated in natural logarithm 
*) Dependent variable of estimation at quintile level is  urea use       
 
The model estimates the threshold at which the relationship between urea used and yields reverses at 
226 (kg/ha) and in line with the recommended amounts by the MoA at 200-250 (kg/ha).  However, it is 
important to note that the maximum of a 2SLS quadratic estimation is sensitive to omitted variable bias. 
The model supports the thesis that overusing urea will have an adverse impact on rice production. Many 
farmers in the survey report using 2 and 3 times the recommended urea levels (Figure 4.1). The overuse 
of urea in Indonesia, particularly when compared with some of its regional peers, and its negative 
impact on soil quality, are well documented.
16 This is mostly the result of distorted factor prices and is 
                                                 
16  Several studies conducted by agriculture research institutes in Indonesia document the negative effects of overusing urea on 
yields and soil quality.  Pantjar and Timmer (2008) document the link between soil degradation and urea overuse and land farming 
intensity in Indonesia.  In the same line, Supriono (2000) explored the impact of urea use on soy bean growth in Central Java and 
found that using urea at 100 kg/ha had  a positive effect on increasing soy plant height, pod numbers per plant, and seed yields per 
plant, but that high levels or urea stifled plant enzymes  and decreased soy bean yields and growth.  Furthermore, Aribawa, et. Al., 
(2006) looked at the effect of urea usage and other organic fertilizer on the soil composition and the growth of long beans in Bali.  
They found that using urea, as the sole fertilizer, decreased the nitrogen elements and the acidity of the soil and recommended 
using a blend  (urea and organic fertilizer) to maintain the high growth of long beans in Bali.   17 
 
more prominent in smaller farmers. Figure 4.1 illustrates graphically the results from Table 4.2 and 
shows how beyond a certain point increasing the use of fertilizer has an adverse effect on yields. 
 
Figure 4.1 Urea and rice yields in 2007 –2SLS model estimation 
 
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
 
The analysis in this section supports the notion that urea usage has a positive impact on yields, with the 
exception of the larger farms, but it still leaves some questions unanswered. It does not answer whether 
the costs at which this improvement in yields is achieved outweigh the benefits. Neither does it discuss 
whether alternative public spending (on irrigation, improved R&D or extension services) may actually 
have a larger impact on productivity than the subsidization of fertilizer.  
To assess the benefits of fertilizer subsidies in terms of rice production, one can look at the elasticities 
estimated in the model in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and calculate the decline in urea usage and in yields that an 
increase in the price of the fertilizer would cause. A removal of the fertilizer subsidy and therefore an 
increase  in  prices  from  the  average  urea  price  paid  by  rice  farmers  according  to  the  2007  survey 
(Rp 1,524/kg) to the estimated market price of Rp 2,170.5/kg would translate into lower consumption of 
urea and a decrease of 6.3 percent in yields per hectare.  (That is, assuming the effect of all other inputs 
is constant.) If one translates this decline to the total rice production for 2008, then, production would 
have been 3.8 million tons lower (from the estimated production of 60.3 million tons by BPS). At an 
average dried grain price of Rp 2,200/kg, the decline in production would have resulted in losses worth 
Rp 8.3 trillion. This decline is much lower than the cost of the fertilizer subsidy, budgeted at Rp 15.2 
trillion in 2008. As such, the GoI could have saved Rp 7 trillion even after accounting for the production 
losses. Estimating the decline in yields resulting from an increase in urea prices using the linear model at 
the quintile level tells a similar story.  If one assumes that a 1 percent increase in the urea price would 
result in a decline in urea usage of 0.35 percent, this would translate into a 5.1 percent decrease in rice 
production.  In terms of the total rice production for 2008, it would represent 3.1 million tons less of rice 
and it would generate losses at around Rp 6.75 trillion. This figure is less than half the fertilizer subsidy 
budget for the year and shows how the benefits from higher production came at a very high cost The 
benefits  of  the  fertilizer  subsidy  could  be  more  widespread,  for  example  other  food  crops  and 
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objective of GoI with this subsidy is to increase rice production, a fair simplification for our purposes is 
to assess benefits solely based on the main policy objective – the increase in rice production. This rough 
estimate suggests that fertilizer subsidies supported increased rice production, but did so at a very high 
cost. It is very likely that the gap between the costs and benefits of this subsidy system has widened in 
2009.  
As initially indicated, this section does not attempt to determine what the drivers of rice production are, 
but instead to establish to what extent fertilizer subsidies have a positive impact on rice production. The 
findings show that fertilizer subsidies have a positive impact on fertilizer use and rice yields, but they do 
so at a very high cost. Also, while the larger farmers are capturing the majority of the subsidies this 
assistance  has  the  smallest  impact  on  yields  compared  with  other  farmers’  groups.  A  reform  that 
reduces or removes the fertilizer subsidy would have to take into account these tradeoffs, as well as the 
fact that smaller farmers are usually credit-constrained and their urea usage is a greater determinant of 
output. A reduction in subsidies could then be combined with assistance in the form of cash transfers to 
allow credit constrained farmers to buy an optimal volume of inputs. The next section discusses the 
benefits of providing public goods compared with subsidizing private inputs. It looks at examples in 
which  subsidizing  private  inputs  may  correct  market  failures,  while  discussing  elements  that  have 
positively contributed to subsidy programs. 
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5. Why Is the Provision of Public Goods Important? 
Only the public sector can supply public goods efficiently (and in adequate quantities). Social returns for 
public goods are higher than private social returns due to positive externalities not captured through 
prices. This provides the rationale for public intervention to provide certain goods and services, since 
markets under-provide them. When supplied in a cost-effective way, public goods can generate higher 
returns than investments in private inputs because they create positive externalities in the economy as a 
whole. The public sector has the capacity to collect individual contributions, can capture economies of 
scale, and will access funding and manage risk better than farmers.  Therefore it is better suited to 
supply public goods and services. 
There  are  trade-offs  between  the  provision  of  public  goods  and  subsidization  of  private  inputs. 
Governments that heavily subsidize private goods do so at the expense of deepening investment in 
public goods that have much higher returns. Investments in rural roads, irrigation, extension services or 
research  are  the  main  drivers  of  agriculture  productivity.
17  Agricultural public goods also have a 
multiplier  effect  and  generate  positive  externalities  for  society  as  a  whole.  Governments  can 
significantly improve the quality of public expenditure  in agriculture by shifting the composition of 
spending towards the provision of public goods and services, and away from private goods subsidization. 
In certain instances, providing subsidies to private inputs may be desirable as a way  of correcting for 
market failures, such as imperfect information, high transaction costs, or  missing credit markets. The 
challenge for governments then is to identify the root of the market failure and seek to increase 
productivity by designing their subsidy program in a manner that corrects for the market failure (e.g. 
encouraging incremental use of inputs by groups that would under-utilize inputs in the absence of the 
subsidy). However, caution should be taken to avoid distorting the relative prices of agricultural inputs 
and encouraging their inefficient use.  
Fertilizer subsidies are justifiable from an economic standpoint if they establish the foundations for a 
sustainable private sector-led input market. They can improve efficiency in the agriculture sector if they 
are able to:  
  Develop a previously constrained or non-existent fertilizer market.  That is, by offsetting high 
initial distribution costs until the market expands, economies of scale are realized and prices 
decline. 
  Encourage technology adoption and diffusion by reducing the initial risk and costs of learning 
new technologies. 
  Overcome constraints in credit markets, where farmers tend to use below optimal levels of 
fertilizers because of imperfect rural credit or insurance markets. 
  Compensate for taxes or output price controls that make fertilizer financially unprofitable, when 
the removal of such taxes or price controls is not feasible. 
  Generate positive environmental externalities by reducing deforestation and soil erosion.   
The government should assess whether there are market failures that warrant the subsidization of 
inputs and whether this is the most cost-effective way to address them. In Indonesia’s case, after three 
decades of fertilizer subsidies, it is debatable whether this subsidy is still necessary to develop a fertilizer 
                                                 
17 Spending on public goods is likely to have higher returns than private goods, as discussed in the policy note Agriculture Public 
Spending and Growth, Indonesia Public Expenditure Review, World Bank. 20 
 
market  or  encourage  the  uptake  of  new  technologies.  Arguably,  smaller  farmers  may  be  credit-
constrained and rural credit markets relatively undeveloped. In this case, the lack of credit or purchasing 
power of smaller farmers should be addressed rather than subsidizing the production of one of the 
many agricultural inputs needed by farmers. The existence of market failures alone does not warrant 
government intervention. It could well be that government intervention in the form of input subsidies 
leads to a worse outcome than in the absence of such interventions or that a similar outcome can be 
achieved at a lower cost. The cost-efficiency of a subsidy system often depends on the design of the 
program, the objectives, the targeting of the beneficiaries, and the delivery mechanism used. Box 1 
below illustrates some of the lessons learned from subsidy programs across the world.  
Box 1  What are the lessons learned from input subsidy programs?
18 
Clear identification and definition of program objectives. This calls for knowledge of what the subsidy seeks to 
achieve  and  the  potential  positive  or  negative  interactions  between  objectives.  Most  importantly,  objectives 
should  be  clear,  with  no  room  for  different  interpretations;  targets  need  to  be  established  that  allow  their 
respective  budgetary  allocations  to  be  set  for  short-  and  long-term  plans.    When  objectives  are  realistic, 
stakeholder expectations can be managed and a sensible post-project impact evaluation can be carried out. 
Setting the program within an agriculture development strategy. An input subsidy program is just one of several 
mechanisms that work together to promote agriculture productivity. When other links are missing, the subsidies 
alone may not do the trick because the market failures they attempt to correct have multi-dimensional causes. 
Thus, they require a multi-dimensional approach.  In addition, only in a broader development strategy can the 
short-term and long-term objectives be well-linked together. 
Targeting.  The program design needs to take into account who are the target beneficiaries, what identification 
criteria  to  use,  and  the  mechanism  for  the  delivery  of  benefits,  in  order  to  minimize  leakage.  By  improving 
coordination and linking the program with existing safety net initiatives, delivery costs were reduced.  
Scale and costs.  Program scale and costs need to be defined and limited from the early design stage. This is the 
area where most input subsidy schemes run into trouble. Input subsidy programs are prone to high risks and these 
costs  should  be  accounted  for  and  quantified.  There  are  many  factors  that  contribute  to  risk,  such  as:  fiscal 
instability,  fraud  and  corruption,  leakage,  and  uncertainty  from  external  shocks  (poor  weather  conditions  or 
international price changes).  All of these can undermine the benefits of the program. 
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E).  Information is the key to understanding where the subsidy is going and what it 
is achieving.  With adequate monitoring of expenditures, activities, outputs and impact, the Government can tailor 
the program to minimize costs and risks.   
Engage with the private sector. Subsidies should be used to leverage broader private sector investment and not 
replace  this  investment.  Subsidies  may  give  businesses  the  incentive  to  investment  further  in  commercially 
sustainable wholesale and retail input supply chains that can reach further into remote rural areas. The exclusion 
of the private sector from the program’s design may drive suppliers/distributors out of business because the 
farmers substitute private with publicly produced fertilizer. This disrupts private activity and makes the market 
more dependent on public suppliers.    
Exit strategy. Subsidies should always be implemented on a temporary basis and provide exit options that are 
conceived at their design stage.  These should be clearly stated before implementation.  
                                                 
18 SOAS et al, 2008. 21 
 
Input subsidies tend to perpetuate over time because they are a highly sensitive issue to voters and at 
the center of the political debate. As many countries have realized, it is politically costly to roll-back 
subsidies because the beneficiaries have politically significant constituencies that will challenge reform 
of the system. Larger farmers are well organized, have strong political power, and lobby for legislation 
that protects their interests. In the case of fertilizer subsidies in Indonesia, the system benefits both 
consumers, and fertilizer producers and distributors. Opposition to a reform to improve the fertilizer 
subsidy system is therefore likely to come from several fronts. 
Subsidies are often justified to achieve social goals (poverty alleviation, reduction of inequality) rather 
than  production  goals.  Governments  have  a  complex  set  of  objectives  and  besides  increasing 
agricultural productivity, they may have objectives such as reducing poverty in rural areas or achieving 
food self-sufficiency. These multiple objectives have to be taken into account when designing a program 
(in Indonesia’s case, both farmers’ welfare and food security are mentioned as key objectives of the GoI 
in the area of agriculture). The attainment of these other goals is often accomplished in a more cost-
effective manner by subsidizing consumption rather than production, through food aid, direct income 
support or cash transfers.  
Lack of quality information to monitor the implementation of a subsidy system and evaluate its impact 
undermines the effectiveness of input subsidies.  When spending on subsidies is poorly monitored, 
authorities have little information about who is benefiting and what the subsidy is achieving. This poor 
monitoring inevitably leads to waste. The lack of impact evaluations and data also render accountability 
mechanism that could provide checks and balances ineffective. Ongoing evaluation of the programs will 
be  needed  to  allow  the  government  to  adjust  the  program  as  needed  in  order  to  increase  its 
effectiveness.  
International Experience with programs to subsidize agriculture inputs 
The  design  of  the  subsidy  system  can  stifle  rather  than  encourage  the  development  of  dynamic 
agricultural  input  markets.  The  Government  of  Zambia  distributes  fertilizer  to  farmers  through 
subsidized loans and often grants. Three main problems have affected the effectiveness of this program: 
there is a fairly poor record of loan repayments, at below 30 percent; late delivery of the fertilizer; and 
poor targeting. This all translates into relatively high fiscal costs, with over 50 percent of the agricultural 
budget (or 3 percent of the total budget) spent on fertilizer subsidies. Incidence benefit analysis showed 
that the wealthiest farmers (both in terms of income and land size) were the ones receiving most of the 
subsidy.  Interviews  with  representatives  of  the  private  sector  have  revealed  their  unwillingness  to 
compete with the government in supplying subsidized fertilizer.  
Until  the  late  1980s,  Bangladesh  distributed  all  fertilizer  through  the  Bangladesh  Agricultural 
Development  Corporation.  In  the  late  1980s,  Bangladesh  reformed  its  fertilizer  distribution  system, 
focusing  on  supporting  technology  transfer  to  improve  farmers’  knowledge  of  fertilizer  use  and 
practices, and to increase private-sector participation in fertilizer imports and domestic marketing. The 
reform resulted in increased participation of the private sector, lower fertilizer prices and increased 
fertilizer use. Research on this reform has highlighted some of the factors behind this success: (i) a 
commercial  credit  program  to  facilitate  access  of  farmers  to  credit,  (ii)  a  program to  foster  dealer 
development and technology transfer, (iii) a strong monitoring and evaluation system, to allow for 
sharing of information among stakeholders and adjustment of programs, and (iv) involvement of all 
stakeholders (government, private sector, donors, banking community and farmers) in the design and 
monitoring of the program.  22 
 
Kenya liberalized its fertilizer markets in the early 1990s, which resulted in a significant increase of 
fertilizer usage, both in food and estate crops. The increase has been driven primarily by small farmers, 
suggesting  that  they  have  benefited  from  this  liberalized  market.  Several  factors  were  behind  this 
success.  Since the early 1990s, the Kenyan government has pursued a stable fertilizer marketing policy, 
eliminating retail price controls, import licensing and quotas. This was followed by rapid investment in 
fertilizer distribution networks by the private sector, which resulted in a denser network of fertilizer 
retailers in rural areas, facilitating the access of farmers to fertilizer. Fertilizer importing and wholesaling 
were  subject  to  intense  competition,  which  led  to  a  halving  of  marketing  margins.  Finally,  the 
emergence of a very profitable horticulture sector increased farmers’ incentives to use fertilizer both for 
horticulture and food crops. 
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Fertilizer subsidies account for a large share of the support that the GoI provides to the agriculture 
sector, and in 2008 they were almost double the entire budget for the Ministry of Agriculture. Although 
there are circumstances under which subsidies can lead to efficient outcomes, by addressing market 
constraints, we argue that this is not the case in Indonesia. In addition, in light of limited fiscal resources, 
there is a trade-off between providing subsidies for private inputs and the provision of public goods and 
services. As such, the Government of Indonesia is spending large amounts on fertilizer subsidies at the 
expense of providing support in other areas that may matter more to farmers and the agriculture sector 
in general (extension services, R&D, irrigation). 
The findings from the two rural household surveys in 2003 and 2007 show there was no targeting of 
benefits for the fertilizer subsidy program. Thus, most rice producers benefit from subsidized fertilizer 
regardless of whether they had small/large paddies or their level of wealth. The effect of this policy is 
regressive and the 40 percent largest farmers capture up to 60 percent of the total subsidy. Fertilizer 
shortages also mean that very few farmers (less than 10 percent in 2007) pay the maximum price as 
stipulated by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
The subsidies contribute to an increased use of urea, which in some cases has resulted in an overuse 
that has a negative impact on yields. Thus, overall the relationship between fertilizer use and rice yields 
is best described as an inverted U-relationship, supporting the existence of an optimum level of fertilizer 
use, beyond which additional consumption has an adverse effect on output. The maximum level of urea 
use,  at  which  the  relationship  with  yields  reverses  from  positive  to  negative,  is  in  line  to  that 
recommended by the MoA. However, most farmers report that they use higher than recommended 
levels of fertilizer. Finally, the findings of this paper suggest that the costs associated with the fertilizer 
subsidy program, both fiscal and economic, outweigh the benefits from achieving higher rice yields. 
Given the problems with the fertilizer subsidy system discussed in previous sections, the agriculture 
sector would be better served if a considerable amount of resources are reallocated. The GoI could 
improve the provision of public services for agriculture by investing in other agriculture public goods, 
which yield higher returns,
19 while keeping two specific objectives in mind: increasing the productivity of 
the agriculture sector, and increasing the welfare of farmers. There is an array of options for using newly 
freed resources, as fertilizer is just one of many determinants of yields and agriculture productivity that 
complement, but do not substitute, investments in: irrigation, extension services, improved agriculture  
marketing (particularly in the outer islands off-Java) and research and development in agriculture.  
There may be a rationale for subsidizing the purchase of agriculture inputs by small farmers who may be 
credit-constrained, in light of the MoA’s goal to improve farmers’ welfare. However, fertilizer subsidies 
are only one of many options to do so and they may not be the most cost-effective instrument. A more 
cost-effective alternative to support small farmers and overcome potential credit-market constraints 
would be to establish a system of cash transfers, an area in which Indonesia already has extensive 
experience. With a well-targeted system of cash transfers for agriculture, farmers would be in a better 
position to determine the level and combination of inputs best suited to their needs. Fertilizer would be 
                                                 
19 Spending on public goods is likely to have higher returns than private goods, as discussed in the policy note Agriculture Public 
Spending and Growth, Indonesia Public Expenditure Review, World Bank. 
 24 
 
one of many inputs to which farmers would have greater access to increase their productivity. Also, a 
cash transfer system is a more effective way to increase farmers’ welfare in the form of income support.  
Deregulation of fertilizer supply would ensure better quality and availability of the input by enforcing 
market competition. The production and distribution of fertilizer is highly regulated, following several 
decades of government intervention to promote the use of fertilizer. The current structure and subsidy 
system may be contributing to the limited capacity utilization in the industry and stifling the entrance of 
private sector actors, limiting competition among fertilizer producers and distributors. This contributes 
to fertilizer shortages, with very few farmers paying at the regulated price (HET). It is not clear whether 
the  current  system  (in  which  the  MoA,  in  coordination  with  other  central  government  agencies, 
determines  the  fertilizer  needs,  production  and  prices  on  a  yearly  basis)  provides  the  necessary 
flexibility to respond to changes in the demand and supply for fertilizer. Deregulation of the supply of 
fertilizer should be combined with monitoring the availability of fertilizer at affordable prices in more 
remote areas, where low demand for agricultural inputs and low profits may prevent the private sector 
from becoming involved. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex I.  Methodology  
1. The market price, the “cost of goods sold” (CoGS), includes: production costs, profit margins of 10 
percent, distribution costs from the plants to the retailer, and a value-added tax of 10 percent.  The 
subsidy was calculated as the difference between the CoGs price and the actual price paid by the 
farmer, while the total subsidy spending  per quintile used the formula: 
 
∑ (CoGs – Farmer’s price) x quantity used by the farmer. 
 
2. The ceiling price (HET) for urea in 2003 was Rp 1,050 per kg up to July and the MoA revised the figure 
to Rp 1,150 for August.  Therefore, the analysis takes the ceiling price of urea for 2003 as Rp 1,150 to 
better capture higher fertilizer consumption during the rainy season months (from September to 
December).  The ceiling price of urea in 2007 was Rp 1,200 per kg, while for SP-36 was Rp 1,500 per 
kg in 2003 and Rp 1,550 per kg in 2007. 
4. The source for the CoGS for urea in 2007 is the State Audit Agency Report 2008 (BPK).  This analysis 
uses a weighted average of the CoGs prices from the four domestic producers, while the CoGS per kg 
= total CoGS/amount of subsidized fertilizer.  These are reported below. 
 
Producer  Production  CoGS  Weighted CoGS 
PETRO GRESIK  318,959  1,850  136.6 
PUSRI  1,395,009  2,068  668.1 
KUJANG  753,870  2,217  387.0 
KALTIM  1,850,505  2,284  978.7 
CoGS of urea per Kg (Rp)  2,170.5 
Source: World Bank staff calculations. 
 
5. The CoGS of urea for 2003 was unavailable in the State Audit Agency and is an estimate. The CoGS 
prices of urea in 2006 and 2007 were available, as well as the CoGS of SP36 in 2003, 2006 and 2007 
from the PT Petrokimia Gresik State Audit Agency Reports (which is the sole producer). Therefore, 
the calculation of the CoGS for urea in 2003 maintains the price ratio of urea to SP36 (using an 
average of the observed ratios for 2006 and 2007) times the CoGS of SP36 in 2003.  This preserves 
the price relationship between both fertilizers, as SP-36 was historically sold at higher prices than 
urea.   
 
Year  CoGS of Urea (Rp/kg)  CoGS of SP-36
 b (Rp/kg)  Ratio (a/b) 
2007  2,170.5  2,395  0.906 
2006  2,054  2,227.8  0.921 
2003  1,489  1,628.8  0.9135 
Source: World Bank staff calculations. 
 
a.  The  non-subsidy  group  represents  farmers  that  paid  above  or  equal  to  the  CoGS  prices. 
b. The partial-subsidy group captures farmers paying above the HET, but below the CoGS prices. 
c. The full-subsidy group takes farmers paying at or below the HET price. 26 
 
Annex II.  Other Fertilizers: Which Farmer Groups Received the Subsidized SP36? 
As in the case of urea, there was no targeting of benefits for the subsidized SP36 and public spending 
was mostly captured by the larger farmers. While in 2003, larger shares of small farmers were receiving 
subsidized SP36, by 2007 these differences across quintiles disappeared (Figures II.1 and II.2). As in the 
case of urea, the share of farmers that received the subsidy increased significantly from 43 percent 
(2003) to 68 percent  (2007), but it remains lower than the share of farmers (96 percent ) capturing 
subsidized urea in 2007. Still, larger producers in quintiles 4 and 5 capture 57 percent (2003) and 62 
percent  (2007). 
Figure II.1.  Farmers receiving subsidized SP36 
by quintiles of land size 2003  
Figure II.2. Farmers receiving subsidized SP36 by 
quintiles of land size 2007 
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
 
Subsidies for SP36 were regressive and larger rice producers captured a large share of the benefits. In 
2007, the quintile with the largest land size captured 38 percent of the total subsidy, while smaller 
farmers in quintiles 1 and 2 only received 7 percent and 14 percent of the total resources, respectively 
(Figures II.3 and II.4 and Figures II.5 & II.6 illustrate the total subsidy captured per quintiles). As with 
urea, the analysis suggests that large fiscal savings are possible through a better targeting mechanism 
that limits the benefits of the subsidy to the smaller farmers in quintiles 1-3. 27 
 
Figure  II.3.  Distribution  of  SP36  subsidy 
spending by quintiles of land size, 2003 
Figure II.4. Distribution of SP36 subsidy spending 
by quintiles of land size, 2007 
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
 
Figure II.5. SP36 subsidy spending by land size, 
2003 
Figure II.6. SP36 subsidy spending by land size, 
2007 
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
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Annex III.  Incidence Analysis for Urea by Quintiles of Rice Gross Revenue 
This section conducts the incidence analysis for subsidized urea by grouping farmers according to the 
size of their rice gross revenues.  In the absence of household income reported in the surveys, one can 
examine whether gross revenues from rice production are a good proxy for a farmer’s income, and 
through it attempt to capture differences in fertilizer consumption that relate to farmers’ wealth. Annex 
IV  provides  further  insights  into  the  adequacy of  gross  revenues  from  rice  as  a  proxy  for  farmers’ 
income.  
The benefit incidence analysis by gross revenues from rice shows a similar picture as the analysis by land 
size. Benefits captured by the farmers with the highest rice gross revenues stood at 68 percent for both 
surveys (in contrast to 60 percent when grouping farmers’ by their land size, Figures III.3 and III.4). 
However,  the differences in gross revenues across quintiles were wide and the individuals in quintile 5 
earned 8 times more than those in quintile 1. In addition, very few farmers paid for the input at the HET 
regulated price.  This is evident from Figure III.2, where most farmers report receiving partial urea 
subsidy and paying above the ceiling price. 
Figure III.1.  Farmers receiving subsidized urea 
by quintiles of gross revenue 2003 
Figure III.2. Farmers receiving subsidized urea by 
quintiles of gross revenue 2007 
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
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 Figure  III.3.  Distribution  of  urea  subsidy  by 
quintiles of gross revenue, 2003 
Figure III.4. Distribution of urea subsidy by 
quintiles of gross revenue, 2007 
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
 
The analysis by rice gross revenues shows larger fiscal savings for the GoI from improving the targeting 
of the urea subsidy.  If the distribution of benefits in 2007 holds (Figure III.6),  while providing subsidies 
only to 60 percent of the farmers with the lowest gross revenues, then the GoI  would have saved 
Rp 10.3 trillion in the 2008 budget. 
Figure III.5. Urea subsidy spending by gross 
revenue, 2003 
Figure III.6. Urea subsidy spending by gross 
revenue, 2007  
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
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Annex IV.  Are Gross Revenues from Rice a Good Proxy for Rural Income? 
This policy note assumes that farmers with smaller plots or lower gross revenues from rice are worse 
off.    This  is  because  there  are  limited  alternative  activities  (off-farm  or  beyond  rice)  that  would 
compensate for small land size or low rice revenues. Although this is clearly an over-simplification, the 
evidence suggests that the assumption holds when looking at asset variables (e.g. quality of housing) in 
the survey and farmers with smaller plots of land or lower gross income from rice are worse off.  
In the absence of an income variable from both surveys, the approach to determine if gross revenues 
from rice are a good proxy for wealth is two-fold:  (i) use asset variables in the 2003 and 2007 surveys  
(the building materials of the farmers’ houses, the quality of  the walls and flooring), and (ii) draw a sub-
sample in 2003 that is limited to those respondents where rice accounts for a larger share of their 
income (50 percent or more) and look at assets in this sub-sample only. In both cases, there is evidence 
showing that farmers with small paddy fields and lower gross revenues are less well-off.
20  
The findings from both 2003 and 2007 surveys suggest gross revenue from rice is a good proxy for rural 
income.  Farmers in the poorer quintiles 1 and 2 report having houses of inferior quality materials, with 
soil floors and bamboo walls, as opposed to  the higher quintiles 4 and 5, having non -soil floors and 
wooden walls.  In both 2003 and 2007 surveys, half of those farmers with soil -floor houses belong to 
quintiles 1 and 2 (respectively, 27 percent and 24 percent in 2003 and 2007, see Tables IV.1-6). Likewise, 
33 percent and 37 percent of the farmers in quintile 1 had bamboo walled housing, while 48  percent 
and 45 percent of the farmers having wood-walled houses belong to higher revenue quintiles 4 and 5.   
Gross Revenue Quintiles  
Table IV.1.  Type of floor, 2003  Table IV.2.  Type of wall, 2003 
Quintile  Non soil  Soil 
1  18%  27% 
2  19%  24% 
3  20%  19% 
4  21%  17% 
5  22%  13% 
Total  100%  100% 
Total  36,226  9,886 
 
Quintile  Brick (batako)  Wood  Bamboo 
1  21%  16%  33% 
2  21%  17%  26% 
3  21%  20%  19% 
4  20%  22%  14% 
5  18%  26%  9% 
Total  100%  100%  100% 
Total  21,928  17,896  5,392 
 
   
Table IV.3.  Type of floor, 2007  Table IV.4.  Type of wall, 2007 
Quintile  Non soil  Soil 
1  19%  23% 
2  19%  23% 
3  20%  18% 
4  21%  18% 
5  21%  18% 
Total  100%  100% 
Total  9,224  2,052 
 
Quintile  Brick   Wood  Bamboo 
1  18%  15%  37% 
2  20%  19%  22% 
3  20%  20%  18% 
4  21%  21%  14% 
5  21%  24%  10% 
Total  100%  100%  100% 
Total  5,746  3,686  1,663 
 
 
   
                                                 
20 The assessment of farmers that sow rice more intensively can only be carried out in the 2003 survey that includes a variable determining the 
size of a farmer’s income derived from rice. 31 
 
Annex IV.1.  Drawing a Sub-Sample:  Farmers Deriving 50 Percent or More of their Gross 
Revenues from Rice  
This  section  draws  new  gross  revenue  quintiles  from  a  sub-sample  of  farmers  reporting  that  rice 
production  accounted  for  50  percent  or more  of  their  household  income.    As  before,  the  findings 
indicate  that  farmers  in  the  lower  quintiles  are  less  well-off  according  to  the  same  asset variables 
(quality of housing).  Most farmers with inferior housing, those living with soil floors and bamboo walls, 
belong to the “poorer” 1 and 2 quintiles, while farmers with better building materials, such as non-soil 
floors, fall in the quintiles 4 and 5. Because these farmers show a similar profile in terms of housing 
quality, one can conclude that using gross revenues from rice is a good way to classify “poorer” farmers 
in the lower quintiles and “wealthier” farmers in the higher quintiles 4 and 5 
Gross Revenue Quintiles 
Table IV.5.  Type of floor, 2003  Table IV.6.  Type of wall,2003 
Quintile  Non soil  Soil 
1  18%  28% 
2  19%  23% 
3  20%  19% 
4  21%  17% 
5  22%  13% 
Total  100%  100% 
Total  18,924  5,953 
 
Quintile  Brick  Wood  Bamboo 
1  19%  17%  34% 
2  21%  18%  26% 
3  21%  20%  18% 
4  20%  21%  13% 
5  19%  25%  9% 
Total  100%  100%  100% 





Annex V.  Sub-Sample: Only Farmers Deriving 50 Percent or More of Their GrossRevenues 
from Rice 
The results corroborate the findings that there 
is no targeting of subsidized urea benefits and 
the regressive nature of the fertilizer subsidy. 
As  in  the  case  of  the  larger  gross  revenue 
sample,  on  average  66  percent  of  farmers 
report  receiving  subsidy  benefits.    This  was 
independent  of  the  size  of  their  rice  gross 
revenues,  which  suggests  that  the  urea 
subsidy  did  not  target  only  the  needier 
farmers (Figure V.1). The leakage of subsidized 
urea  benefits  that  supported  the  wealthier 
quintiles 4 and 5 stood at 67 percent.  This 
represented  Rp 348  million,  which  was 
significantly  more  than  the  combined  share 
received  by  the  lower  quintiles  1,  2,  and  3. 
(Figures V.2 and V.3) 
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
 
Figure V.1.  Farmers receiving subsidized urea 
by quintiles of gross revenue, 2003 
 
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
Figure V.2.  Distribution of urea subsidy 




Annex VI.  Sensitivity Analysis. What if Market Prices Decreased or Increased by 10 percent? 
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to explore whether increasing or decreasing the estimation of the 
market price (CoGS) can be a driver of the findings.  However, our results are validated by the fact that 
changes to the CoGS prices yield the same outcome for the incidence analysis.  Thus, while the number 
of farmers receiving benefits changes, whether more or less farmers receive partial and/or total subsidy 
support,  it  does  not  alter  the  distribution  of  benefits  across  quintiles.    Therefore,  the  evidence  of 
leakage is clear and the fact that the subsidy is regressive persists because it is captured mostly by the 
larger farmers (and by the richer according to their reported rice gross revenues). (Figures VI.1 –VI.3) 
Figure VI.1.  Farmers receiving subsidized urea by quintiles of land size, 2007 
If market price (CoGS) decreased 10%   Increased 10%  
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
Figure. VI.2  Distribution of urea subsidy spending by quintiles of land size, 2007 
If market price (CoGS) decreased 10%   Increased 10%  
   





Figure.  VI.3.  Urea subsidy spending by land size, 2007 
If market price (CoGS) decreased 10%   Increased 10% 
   
Source: World Bank staff  calculations. 
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Annex VII.  Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and OLS 
 
The model in Section 3 was estimated with instrumental variables (2SLS) because of the correlation  
between urea usage and the error term in the yields equation that would render OLS inconsistent.  This 
correlation is most likely the result of omitted variable bias, but can also stem from various sources, 
such  as  (i)  measurement  error  in  the  urea  variable  from  the  survey;  or    (ii)  simultaneity,  if  the 
relationship is one of reverse causality, where the yields determine urea used through income, but urea 
usage is a driver of rice production.    
 
In the absence of endogeneity, OLS will always produce more efficient estimates. Therefore, this section 
compares the results of 2SLS and an estimation using OLS.   By construction, the first-stage regression of 
the 2SLS and OLS are the same, it is in the second-stage regression that the endogeneity is present.  
Thus, the Table VII. 1 below shows the output of the model estimated without using instrumental 
variables.    These  findings  suggest  that  the  model  estimates  under  OLS  are  in  line  with  the  2SLS 
estimation.  While the impact from urea varies in magnitude, the direction and significance is similar and 
almost the same for the non-fertilizer inputs. 
 
Table VII.1. Estimation results using 2SLS (second stage regression results) and OLS 
 






(1)  (2)  (3) 
Urea use  4.2098  0.3426 
  (2.26)*  (9.12)** 
Urea use squared  -0.3882  -0.0016 
  (-2.08)*  (-0.79) 
Land size  -0.0959  -0.1237 
  (-5.86)**  (-24.85)** 
Labor cost  0.0431  0.0656 
  (3.08)**  (18.34)** 
Dummy irrigation  0.0339  0.0136 
  (2.76)**  (1.77)+ 
HH's head education  -0.0006  0.0030 
  (-0.32)  (2.93)** 
HH's head age  -0.001  -0.0002 
  (-1.82)+  (-0.67) 
Dummy for Java- Bali   -0.0937  -0.0680 
  (-4.49)**  (-7.81)** 
Constant  -2.3646  7.0767 
  (-0.52)  (69.19)** 
R-squared  .  0.34 
z statistics in parentheses    
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
All variables are estimated in natural logarithm 
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